Frankfurt’s definition of second order volitions arises in the service of his compatibilist conception of free will. Under his analysis an individual has free will if and only if he meets the following conditions:
he has certain second-order volitions;
he has no first-order volitions that are discordant with his actual second-order volitions;
he has those and only those first-order volitions that have been, directly or indirectly, produced by his actual second-order volitions.
By contrast, Aristotle is a libertarian. In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, he locates the origin of the agent’s actions within him, and stipulates that it is up to him to do them or not to do them. Within this framework, his ideas of cultivating virtue and avoiding self-indulgence cannot carry the weight of anticipating distinctions in the orders of desires and volitions.
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timeasmymeasure
no subject
Date: 2008-08-09 07:43 pm (UTC)- he has certain second-order volitions;
- he has no first-order volitions that are discordant with his actual second-order volitions;
- he has those and only those first-order volitions that have been, directly or indirectly, produced by his actual second-order volitions.
By contrast, Aristotle is a libertarian. In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, he locates the origin of the agent’s actions within him, and stipulates that it is up to him to do them or not to do them. Within this framework, his ideas of cultivating virtue and avoiding self-indulgence cannot carry the weight of anticipating distinctions in the orders of desires and volitions.