Any philosophical position can be linked to Aristotle in his capacity of the first notable footnoter of Plato. In the event, this connection founders on the more proximate and better acknowledged predecessors of Frankfurt such as Descartes and Spinoza. Hence the abiding relevance of compatibilism via necessitarianism implied by the principle of sufficient reason.
Incidentally, indices absent from Frankfurt’s books can be emulated via the Amazon “Search Inside” function.
To clarify my question, actions that proceed from passion are by definition teleological. They aim to cure a lack. This aim preempts their capacity for answering to principle regardless of anticipated outcomes. By contrast, answerability to principle is a general condition of modern deontology, as distinct e.g. from its classical theological construal in the manner of Augustine’s “Dilige, et quod vis fac.” On the other hand, by making allowances for supererogation, even the deontologist leaves room for accommodating diverse norms of character. (Here I am construing character broadly, as ἦθος rather than ἕξις.) So the duty in regard to a certain course of action may be perfect or imperfect, depending on its mandate by the agent’s character. Thus even in the absence of a conflict of duties, it is possible to accommodate individual differences of principle. I am interested in learning whether or not more substantive accommodations of character are available within deontology.
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timeasmymeasure
no subject
Date: 2008-08-10 12:59 am (UTC)Incidentally, indices absent from Frankfurt’s books can be emulated via the Amazon “Search Inside” function.
To clarify my question, actions that proceed from passion are by definition teleological. They aim to cure a lack. This aim preempts their capacity for answering to principle regardless of anticipated outcomes. By contrast, answerability to principle is a general condition of modern deontology, as distinct e.g. from its classical theological construal in the manner of Augustine’s “Dilige, et quod vis fac.” On the other hand, by making allowances for supererogation, even the deontologist leaves room for accommodating diverse norms of character. (Here I am construing character broadly, as ἦθος rather than ἕξις.) So the duty in regard to a certain course of action may be perfect or imperfect, depending on its mandate by the agent’s character. Thus even in the absence of a conflict of duties, it is possible to accommodate individual differences of principle. I am interested in learning whether or not more substantive accommodations of character are available within deontology.